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 Abstract 
 
 The Limits of “Rational Design” 
 
 John S. Duffield 
 
 
“The Rational Design of International Institutions” (special issue of IO, autumn 2001) makes a 
significant contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions.  It is important, 
however, to recognize the limits of the Rational Design project in its current form and of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the special issue about the project’s usefulness and validity.  
This paper evaluates the project on its own terms, as a rationalist attempt to explain variation in 
international institutions.  It identifies three significant sets of limitations: those of the scope of 
the project, those of the analytical framework, and those of the efforts that are made to evaluate 
the framework through empirical analysis.  Although the first set of limitations is largely a matter 
of choice, the last two raise questions about how much of an advance the special issue in fact 
represents.  Nevertheless, these shortcomings are not absolute but can be remedied through 
further theoretical and empirical research. 
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 “The Rational Design of International Institutions” (special issue of IO, autumn 2001) 
makes a significant contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions.  It 
addresses an important and interesting question – how to explain variation in institutional forms 
– and offers a promising analytical framework for doing so.  Like regime theory in the 1980s, 
this framework potentially encompasses a wide range of empirical phenomena.  But in contrast 
to initial formulations of regime theory, it systematically identifies multiple dimensions of 
institutional variation and offers potentially testable conjectures about the relationship between 
them and a variety of possible determinants. 
 At the same time, however, it is important to recognize the current limits of the Rational 
Design project and of the conclusions that can be drawn from the special issue about the 
project’s usefulness and validity as an explanation of institutional variation.  As opposed to the 
critique offered by Alexander Wendt as part of that special issue, which presents what is 
primarily an “external” perspective, this paper seeks to evaluate “The Rational Design of 
International Institutions” on its own terms, as a rationalist attempt to explain international 
institutions.  It identifies three significant sets of limitations.  Some concern the scope of the 
project.  Others are to be found in the analytical framework as presented.  And yet others pertain 
to the efforts that are made to evaluate the framework through empirical analysis. 
 Although the first set of limitations is largely a matter of choice, the last two raise serious 
questions about the ability of the Rational Design project in its current state of development to 
offer a compelling and satisfactory explanation of institutional forms.  Nevertheless, these 
shortcomings are not absolute but can be remedied through further theoretical and empirical 
research.  A concluding section offers suggestions for how this might be done. 
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I.  Limitations in Scope 
 The purposes of the Rational Design project are stated clearly in the first and last articles, 
both of which are co-authored by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal.  In 
the first article, they write that “Our main goal is to offer a systematic account of the wide range 
of design features that characterize international institutions.”1  And in the concluding article, 
they reiterate that “The main aim of the Rational Design project was to develop an explanatory 
framework and begin to test it against available empirical evidence.”2 
 Accordingly, the special issue consists of two principal parts.  The first article lays out 
the basic analytical framework of the project.  After offering a definition of international 
institutions, it specifies the dependent and independent variables that will be the subject of 
inquiry and then derives a set of informal “conjectures” linking the two sets of variables.  The 
framework article is followed by eight articles that focus on international institutions in a range 
of issue-areas.  Several of these articles seek to extend and elaborate upon the framework, but 
most of them involve attempts to evaluate the framework and the conjectures derived from it 
against empirical material.  In the final article, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal summarize the 
findings of the empirical articles, discuss what they view as some of the broader implications, 
and then address the gap Wendt identifies between the positivist aspirations of the project and 
the normative questions associated with the actual process of institutional design.  They conclude 
that “[i]n general, the results strongly support the conjectures” and that although the framework 
may have limitations, these do not diminish its value and that some of the most obvious 
                                                 
1Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 762. 
2Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1052. 
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omissions can be readily incorporated.3 
 One question that should be immediately asked of any such theoretically-oriented 
enterprise concerns the breadth of its applicability.  Obviously, no single research project can do 
everything, especially in the span of a single special issue.  But it is nevertheless important to 
make clear what lies outside the scope of the project as well as what it comprehends.  Two 
particular limitations of scope are noted here: the empirical domain to which the project applies 
and the types of questions that are asked. 
 
A.  A Narrow Conception of Institutions 
 A first significant limitation of the Rational Design project concerns the range of 
international institutions to which it applies.  Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal are to be 
commended for offering a definition of international institutions at the very outset: “explicit 
arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize 
behavior.”4  One problem with this definition, which becomes clear in the following pages, is 
that it does not readily accommodate all of the types of international institutions that Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal aspire to analyze.  Although they state that the definition includes formal 
international organizations, subsequent references to international organizations as agents or 
actors that perform various functions do not fit easily with the conception of institutions as 
arrangements that simply “prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.”5 
 Nevertheless, this definitional flaw could be easily remedied.  Of greater significance 
                                                 
3Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1056. 
4Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 762. 
5Ibid., 763. 
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therefore is the fact that the definition clearly excludes a wide range of other important 
international institutional forms.  The organizers explicitly exclude “tacit bargains and implicit 
guidelines,” describing them as general forms of cooperation.  The problem here is that 
influential previous definitions of international institutions frequently included such forms.  For 
example, the early “consensus” definition of international regimes refers to implicit as well as 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.6  Likewise, Robert Keohane’s 
influential definition of international institutions embraces “implicit rules and understandings.”7 
 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal seem less aware of the fact that their definition also 
excludes constitutive institutions.  By now, most students of institutions would agree that 
institutions do more than just “prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.”  In addition, they 
sometimes create actors, endow them with certain capabilities, and define categories of action.  
In other words, institutions may “create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain 
kind.”8  Moreover, such institutions often take the form of explicit, negotiated arrangements.  
Thus the U.N. Charter creates the Security Council as well as a number of other bodies and 
defines their powers and the actions they may take. 
 Perhaps most fundamentally, the definition completely ignores those international 
institutions that are primarily intersubjective in nature.  Kratochwil and Ruggie have pointed out 
that regimes and social institutions more generally have an inescapable intersubjective quality.9  
As such, they are fundamentally ideational phenomena involving ideas that are shared by 
                                                 
6Krasner 1983, 2. 
7Keohane 1989, 4. 
8Schauer 1991, 6. 
9Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 754.  See also Ruggie 1983, 196. 
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members of a collectivity.10 
 This truncated conception of international institutions is reinforced by the narrow focus 
on negotiated forms.  The Rational Design project considers only those institutions that are “the 
fruits of agreement” and “the self-conscious creations of states” and other international actors.11  
Scholars have long recognized, however, that international institutions may arise through other 
processes as well.  For example, Oran Young has identified two additional developmental 
sequences, involving self-generating or spontaneous arrangements and imposed arrangements, 
respectively.12  The Rational Design project nowhere recognizes the possibility of imposition, 
even though it can be an important source of “explicit arrangements...that prescribe, proscribe, 
and/or authorize behavior” and is no less likely to guided by rational calculation.  And although 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal belatedly acknowledge and briefly discuss the possibility of 
spontaneous and evolutionary processes, they do not address their implications for the types of 
institutions that may result.13  In fact, these processes are likely to be the source of many 
constitutive and perhaps all primarily intersubjective institutions. 
 Of course, no research project on international institutions should be obliged to subsume 
the full range of manifestations of the subject.  Indeed, it may not be possible to talk in a 
meaningful way about the “rational design” of many types of international institutions.  At the 
same time, many international institutions do fit the definition of explicit, negotiated 
arrangements, ensuring that the Rational Design project will apply to a large number of cases.  
                                                 
10Wendt 1999, 94, 96. 
11Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 762. 
12Young 1989, 84-89. 
13Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1077-78. 
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Nevertheless, when a project’s embrace of a phenomenon is less than universal, it is important to 
make clear in the definition what is excluded as well as what is included. 
 
B.  A Limited Set of Questions 
 A second limitation of the Rational Design project concerns the types of questions that it 
asks.  Many of the early attempts to develop general theories of international institutions -- 
primarily in the guise of international regimes -- in the 1970s and 1980s focused on them as 
dependent variables.  Whether or not international institutions actually mattered was largely 
assumed.  Only in the 1990s did scholarly attention increasingly focus on their effects.  As 
Martin and Simmons observed in their 1998 review of the institutional literature, “the strength of 
[the rationalist] approach has largely been its ability to explain the creation and maintenance of 
international institutions.  It has been weaker at delineating their effects on state behavior and 
other significant outcomes...”14  Consequently, they argued that “research should increasingly 
turn to the question of how institutions matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in 
world politics.”15 
 The Rational Design project, however, moves in the opposite direction, revisiting 
international institutions as dependent variables.  To be sure, much important work remains to be 
done on the determinants of international institutions.  But insofar as the theoretical literature is 
further developed in this area, this choice of focus requires a greater degree of justification and 
any resulting claims must necessarily be subjected to a relatively higher level of scrutiny.  In 
particular, the claims must, at a minimum, be explicitly evaluated against previous attempts to 
                                                 
14Martin and Simmons 1998, 738. 
15Ibid., 729, 730. 
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explain variations in institutional form in order to establish the value added.16 
 
II.  Limitations of the Framework 
 Having clarified the scope of the Rational Design project, the next step is to assess the 
adequacy of the analytical framework presented by Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal as a basis for 
developing generalizations about institutional design.  In fact, although the framework represents 
a reasonable first cut, it nevertheless contains significant shortcomings, which can be found in 
each of the three main components: the specification of dependent variables, the specification of 
independent variables, and the derivation of hypothesis-like conjectures linking the two. 
 
A.  Dependent Variables 
 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal highlight five dimensions of institutional variation, which 
become the dependent variables of the Rational Design project: membership rules, scope of 
issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institutions, and flexibility of 
arrangements.  As a starting point, this is a useful conceptualization, one that seeks to strike a 
balance between the competing demands of distinguishing the most important institutional 
features and producing a framework that is both manageable in size and susceptible to empirical 
testing.  Nevertheless, it does raise some questions. 
 One question is whether the framework includes all the most important dependent 
variables.  Other noteworthy studies of international institutions have emphasized different 
dimensions of variation. For example, Jeffrey Legro, in his study of international norms, 
                                                 
16E.g., Snidal 1985; Lipson 1991; Martin 1992b. 
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identifies specificity as an important variable.17  And the special issue of International 
Organization on “Legalization and World Politics” highlights three dimensions – obligation, 
precision, and delegation –  that find no direct parallels in the Rational Design project.18  
Although there is no canonical set of dependent variables that must be included in every study, at 
least some discussion of logical alternatives and the reasons for excluding them is warranted. 
 That said, there may be more overlap in this regard between the Rational Design project 
and previous studies than is readily apparent.  For example, precision and specificity could be 
elements of flexibility.  Likewise, delegation could in principle be closely related to 
centralization.  Nevertheless, these possible links are obscured by an excessive degree of 
generality.  The authors acknowledge that “[i]n some cases, our dimensions must be refined to 
clarify design issues in specific institutions.”19  Arguably, however, at least some further 
disaggregation should have been attempted at the outset in order to ensure adequate 
conceptualization of the variables and to facilitate the subsequent evaluation of the framework.  
 The problems that result from excessive aggregation are perhaps most apparent in the 
case of centralization, which refers to the performance of important institutional tasks by “a 
single focal entity.”20  Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal recognize that “Centralization, for 
instance, is a broad category – perhaps too broad for some cases”21 and they conclude that 
“because our conception of centralization is very broad, an important avenue of inquiry will be to 
                                                 
17Legro 1997. 
18Abbott et al. 2000. 
19Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 769. 
20Ibid., 771. 
21Ibid., 769. 
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refine this concept into its different components.”22  In particular, they envision a finer 
differentiation of tasks.23 
 In focusing on the question of which tasks are centralized, however, Koremenos, Lipson, 
and Snidal overlook the equally important question of how tasks are centralized.  Most if not all 
formal international organizations involve some centralization of tasks.  In some instances, 
however, these tasks are performed by intergovernmental bodies consisting of the entire 
membership, in other cases they are performed by bodies consisting of but a subset of the 
members (e.g., the U.N. Security Council), and in yet others they are delegated to supranational 
bodies (e.g., the European Commission).24  The brief reference to “a single focal entity” obscures 
this important dimension of potential institutional variation.  Likewise, the discussion of 
centralization does not address the related issues of authority and capabilities.  A body may 
possess the authority to perform a particular task but not the capability to do so, and vice versa.  
More generally, this discussion underscores the need to pay attention to the critical constitutive 
choices involved in the design of many international institutions. 
 
B.  Independent Variables 
 Despite these limitations, much more problematic is the Rational Design project’s 
                                                 
22Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1060. 
23Subsequent discussions identify such distinct tasks as disseminating information, 
monitoring behavior and collecting information, reducing bargaining and transaction costs, 
facilitating communication, setting standards, adjudicating disputes, coordinating operational 
activities, and enforcing agreements. 
24See, for example, Tallberg 2002. 
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specification of independent variables.  Four sets of these are included in the framework: 
distribution problems; enforcement problems; number of actors and the asymmetries among 
them; and uncertainty about others’ behavior, the state of the world, and others’ preferences.25  
Once again, the project fails even to discuss systematically other obvious candidates, especially 
those that have figured prominently in previous rationalist analyses of institutions, and to explain 
why they are excluded.  Certainly, a number of possibilities exist.  As a result of this omission, 
one is justified in questioning from the outset how complete – and thus satisfactory -- an 
explanation of institutional choice the project is likely to be able to provide. 
 First, the framework contains no explicit discussion of interests.  In contrast, the starting 
point of most rationalist analyses of international institutions as dependent variables is the 
interests -- or preferences over outcomes -- of the actors.  As Stephen Krasner noted two decades 
ago, “The prevailing explanation for the existence of international regimes is egoistic self-
interest.”26  To be sure, rationalist analyses often move on to examine the cooperation problems 
that result from different constellations of actor interests.27  But the fact that interests are among 
the ultimate determinants of institutional outcomes – or, in Krasner’s terminology, the basic 
causal variables – and therefore deserving of explicit mention is not in dispute.   
 Likewise, a number of rationalist -- not to mention neorealist -- analyses of institutions 
have also considered the power, or capabilities, of actors as an additional key determinant.28  Yet 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal devote only one paragraph (under number of actors) to a 
                                                 
25Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 773. 
26Krasner 1983, 11. 
27E.g., Stein 1983; Snidal 1985; Martin 1992b. 
28E.g., Krasner 1983; Krasner 1991; Martin 1992b; Richards 1999; Gruber 2000. 
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discussion of the implications of differences in the distribution of actors’ capabilities.  They seek 
to compensate somewhat for this neglect with a two-page discussion of the role of power in the 
final article, where they state that power considerations are highly compatible with the 
framework.29  Nevertheless, they offer little or no discussion of the types of capabilities that may 
matter or the circumstances under which they may influence institutional choices. 
 This inattention to power is especially troubling in view of the frequency with which 
distribution problems appear in the case studies (six of the eight).  These are precisely the 
situations in which previous analyses have argued that capabilities are likely to play a central 
role in determining institutional outcomes.30  Even if one accepts the project’s exclusion of 
developmental sequences that might involve the use of coercion, moreover, the ability to make 
side payments may greatly influence negotiations over institutional forms.  The implication of 
this omission is that if the objective is to explain institutional choice, the framework may apply 
in only a very restrictive set of circumstances: those in which actors either lack or are unwilling 
to exploit their capabilities to coerce or to offer inducements for the purpose of obtaining 
institutions that better serve their individual interests. 
 A third common rationalist variable that does not appear in the framework is the presence 
or absence of potentially useful institutions.  Whether or not an institution involving more or less 
the same potential set of states and operating in a related issue area already exists would 
presumably have a major impact on institutional choice.  In particular, given the various costs 
involved in creating institutions, actors seeking to pursue common interests in a new area may 
prefer to make use of pre-existing institutions wherever possible rather than start from scratch, 
                                                 
29Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1067-69. 
30E.g., Krasner 1991. 
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especially if they are assumed to be risk-averse, as the project does.  In such circumstances, the 
focus shifts from determining which new institutional design is most rational to asking when and 
to what degree the actors will avail themselves of pre-existing institutional arrangements. 
 The issue of institutional path-dependence is briefly touched upon in the framework 
article,31 although not in the discussion of the independent variables, and then revisited in the 
conclusion under the heading of “Dynamics of Institutional Change.”32  But these brief mentions 
are insufficient to do justice to the subject.  For example, there is no recognition of the concept of 
institutional assets, which may be essential for explaining the continued reliance on international 
organizations such as NATO and the IMF that have outlived many if not all of their original 
purposes.33  In fact, the authors implicitly acknowledge the importance of institutional path-
dependence when they note that the number of actors is “often determined by prior political and 
institutional arrangements.”34  And one of the following case studies is exclusively concerned 
with actors’ choices among pre-existing institutional fora.35  Consequently, it is all the more 
puzzling that this potential causal factor did not receive more explicit attention in the framework. 
 Also missing from the framework is any discussion of the role of ideas, which have 
appeared with increasing frequency in rationalist explanations of individual behavior and 
collective outcomes.  Goldstein and Keohane have distinguished among three different types of 
                                                 
31Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 767. 
32Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1075-76. 
33Wallander 2000. 
34Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 777. 
35Mattli 2001. 
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ideas that may influence policy: world views, causal beliefs, and principled beliefs.36  These 
distinctions are highly isomorphic to the categories of norms and principles and knowledge 
included in Krasner’s typology of variables that explain regime development, although he treats 
the latter as an intervening rather than a basic causal variable.37 
 Ideational factors such as world views and cause-effect beliefs -- or knowledge –  provide 
answers to a set of basic questions that rational actors must typically answer before they can 
determine which course of action is likely to maximize their utility.  In particular, knowledge 
may play an important role in shaping institutional design by influencing among other things 
how issues are defined, what are regarded to be the relevant actors, which institutional options 
are seen to exist, and the expected consequences of different institutional choices.  For their part, 
however, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal at most hint at the possibility that institutional scope is 
sometimes determined by cognitive factors in a brief reference to how issues are framed.38 
 Rationalist analyses sometimes also invoke principles in order to account for the interests 
or preferences of actors.39  In contrast, behavioral norms would seem to be incompatible with the 
rationalist assumption of utility maximization.  Nevertheless, they too might merit at least some 
discussion insofar as they figure prominently in more general explanations of institutional 
choice.40  Indeed, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal come close to acknowledging the potentially 
important role of norms when they note that institutions “may build on less formal arrangements 
                                                 
36Goldstein and Keohane 1993. 
37Krasner 1983. 
38Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 771. 
39Goldstein and Keohane 1993. 
40Wendt 2001, 1024-27. 
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that have evolved over time and are then codified and changed by negotiation,”41 and at least one 
of the following case studies focuses on a set of “normative values” and “informal 
understandings” that were formalized in treaty form.42 
 Instead of interests, power, pre-existing institutions, or ideas, the analytical framework 
places primary emphasis on distribution and enforcement problems as independent variables.  As 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal admit in the conclusion, “The Rational Design project has one 
overriding aim: to make explicit the connections between specific cooperation problems and 
their institutional solutions.”43  Certainly, these relationships are important and well worth 
exploring, as other seminal theoretical studies have done before.44  But the characterization of 
cooperation problems as independent variables is problematic, especially in view of the 
alternatives that were not explicitly considered in the framework. 
 In fact, distribution and enforcement problems are themselves the result of more basic 
causal variables.  Whether or not a particular type of cooperation problem exists and how severe 
it is depend critically on how a situation is perceived, which actors are potentially involved, and 
the interests, power, and beliefs of those actors.45  A change in any of those factors may alter the 
nature of the problem. 
 It could perhaps be argued that different types of cooperation problems serve as a useful 
                                                 
41Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 763. 
42Morrow 2001, 971. 
43Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1051. 
44E.g., Stein 1993; Snidal 1985; Martin 1992b. 
45Zürn (1997, 296-98), for example, notes the need to identify the constellation of actor 
interests in order to know the type of game that is being played. 
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shorthand for particular combinations of such more fundamental variables.  Koremenos, Lipson, 
and Snidal note in the conclusion that they asked the contributors “to specify preference 
configurations in terms of distribution and enforcement problems relevant to their cases.”46  
Nevertheless, insofar as it is impossible to characterize a cooperation problem without reference 
to underlying interests, power distributions, and beliefs, the latter deserve to be made an explicit 
part of the analytical framework. 
 Moreover, the failure to include them explicitly may undermine the validity of any causal 
inferences that are drawn.  Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal claim in the conclusion that the 
omission of power from the analytical framework carries no risk of omitted variable bias since 
“it is not at all clear that power should be correlated with our independent variables.”47  In fact, 
however, power considerations can significantly determine the intensity of distribution and 
enforcement problems by influencing relative gains concerns and the cost of the “sucker’s 
payoff,” respectively.  
 
C.  Conjectures 
 The framework culminates with a series of conjectures that link the dependent and 
independent variables.  The authors are careful to differentiate these implicitly from hypotheses 
by noting that they represent generalizations but are not formally derived.  Nevertheless, the 
conjectures play a vital role in the project by providing a bridge between the framework and the 
empirical articles. 
 Immediately apparent is the absence of a systematic linkage between the dependent and 
                                                 
46Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1072. 
47Ibid., 1069. 
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independent variables.  Depending upon how one counts the variables, the authors may offer 
conjectures for fewer than half (16 of 35) of the possible causal relationships (see Table 1).  Even 
the two types of cooperation problems are each linked by conjectures to only three of the five 
dependent variables.  Although there is no logical reason why every independent variable should 
potentially influence every dependent variable in the framework, this lack of comprehensiveness, 
which goes unremarked, raises further questions about the criteria by which the variables were 
selected. 
 One must also ask how much of an advance the set of conjectures offered represents upon 
the existing scholarly literature.  In order to address this question, it may be useful to focus on 
the conjectures concerning centralization.  These are not only the most numerous (four versus 
three for each of the other dependent variables), but they are also evaluated most frequently in 
the case studies and figure among the “three general observations [that] stand out among [the] 
empirical results.”48 
 Perhaps the most extensive previous theoretical discussion of centralization appears in 
Lisa Martin’s “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.”49  Although the avowed purpose of that 
article is described in different terms -- “to explain variation in the organizing principles and 
strength of [formal multilateral] organizations on the basis of the strategic problems facing 
states” -- it is directly relevant to the question at hand.50  Indeed, at one point Martin explicitly 
                                                 
48Ibid., 1054. 
49Martin 1992b.  But see also Snidal 1985, which focuses on “the fundamental question 
of what sorts of regimes are appropriate for resolving particular problems of collective action” 
(923). 
50Martin 1992b, 767. 
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equates formal organizations with “centralization.”51 
 In fact, Martin largely anticipates the Rational Design project’s conjectures about 
centralization and goes beyond them in one important respect.  Similar to Koremenos, Lipson, 
and Snidal, Martin argues that situations involving substantial incentives to defect from 
agreements (“collaboration problems” in Martin, “enforcement problems” in Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal) should lead to relatively strong organizations.52  Martin further argues that 
games involving “major distributional implications” (“coordination problems” in her 
terminology) do not require strong institutions, which is consistent with the fact that Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal do not offer a conjecture linking centralization with distribution problems.53  
Unlike Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, Martin’s analysis does not explicitly address the impact 
of number, although she does note that multilateral organizations do “typically have a large 
number of members” and summarizes the logical reasons why this might be the case.54  
Likewise, although Martin nowhere discusses behavioral uncertainty per se, she does mention 
that multilateral organizations could deal with difficulties such as “opportunities for undetected 
free riding.”55  Finally, Martin devotes several pages, under the subject of “assurance problems,” 
to a discussion of how uncertainty over preferences may generate a demand for formal 
organizations for the purpose of centralized information exchange.  Although she recognizes that 
the role of formal organizations in assurance games will be limited to this function, the lack of a 
                                                 
51Ibid., 770. 
52Ibid., 770, 792. 
53Ibid., 776. 
54Ibid., 773. 
55Ibid. 
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corresponding conjecture linking uncertainty over preferences to centralization in the Rational 
Design framework is puzzling, especially given the prominence of informational considerations 
in all four of the existing centralization conjectures.56 
 To the extent that one can raise questions about the originality of the individual 
conjectures, perhaps the greatest potential contribution of the framework lies in its ability to 
suggest when variation in a particular independent variable will be accompanied by variation in a 
particular dependent variable.  As Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal rightly recognize, institutional 
design may involve choices among multiple institutional equilibria.  There may be no unique 
institutional arrangement that best addresses a particular combination of problems associated 
with distribution, enforcement, numbers, and uncertainty.  Unfortunately, however, although 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal identify the basic ways in which the dependent variables may 
interact among themselves – as substitutes, complements, or conflicts57 – they “do not offer any 
arguments that explain when one approach would be used in place of another or when different 
design combinations might be chosen.”58 
 
III.  Limitations of the Empirical Evaluation 
 The bulk of the Rational Design special issue consists of eight “empirical” articles.  
These articles serve several functions, including developing the conjectures further and 
                                                 
56It is not clear whether Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal consulted this particular work by 
Martin.  Although the text contains a citation to it (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 790), 
the accompanying discussion suggests that the reference should in fact be to Martin 1992a. 
57Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 795-96. 
58Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1062. 
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extending the theoretical framework.  Arguably, however, their most important purpose is to 
“[evaluate the] conjectures in the context of many different areas of international politics.”59  As 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal note, “The ultimate value of our framework depends on its 
ability to explain phenomena across a range of substantive issues.”60 
 Obviously, the task of evaluating the many conjectures cannot be completed in a single 
volume.  Nevertheless, one might reasonably expect that, in the course of eight carefully chosen 
and well-designed case studies spanning more than 200 pages, a good deal of progress could be 
made.  In fact, however, because of problems with the choice and execution of the cases, they are 
able to provide at best a very limited evaluation. 
 
A. Case Selection 
 Although the empirical cases studies do cover a number of areas, they can hardly be said 
to be representative of the full range of substantive issues.  Five of the eight articles deal with 
economic issues, and of those, three are primarily concerned with trade arrangements.  Two 
more articles address security issues, but one of those concerns institutional arrangements -- 
POW treaties -- that are relatively peripheral to the core security interests of states while the 
other focuses narrowly on the criteria for admitting new members to NATO.  Only one article 
covers environmental and natural resource issues, while none are devoted to such areas as broad 
political and diplomatic relations, human rights, science and technology, health, culture, and 
education, among others. 
 Nevertheless, even a substantively unrepresentative set of cases could be used to conduct 
                                                 
59Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 797. 
60Ibid., 796. 
  24 
a qualified evaluation of the conjectures, if properly framed.  Ideally, the cases would be as 
comparable as possible while exhibiting variation along one or more of the dimensions of 
interest.  In fact, however, they fall well short of achieving this methodological desideratum. 
 Above all, few of the cases fit neatly with the project’s stated focus on the rational design 
of explicit, negotiated arrangements.  Three of the cases, arguably, are at best tangential.  The 
subject of the article by Pahre is centralized bargaining, or “clustering,” yet as Pahre himself 
admits, “clustering does not meet the Rational Design definition of an institution.”61  Morrow’s 
article on POW treaties deals with “normative values” and “informal understandings” that were 
codified and formalized in treaties, raising questions about how much discretion the designers of 
the formal arrangements actually had.62  And Mattli’s article focuses on the selection by private 
parties among alternative pre-existing methods of international commercial dispute resolution, 
leaving unexamined the design of those institutions in the first place.63 
 These three cases may be interesting and important in their own right, but given the 
abundance of situations that would clearly fit the project’s stated focus, it is puzzling that more 
effort was not made to ensure that the cases were comparable in this respect.  Of the remaining 
five case studies, two “are primarily formal exercises”64 that contain little by way of empirical 
material and thus have little to contribute to the assessment of the conjectures, while a third is 
evenly divided between a formal extension of the framework and an examination of evidence.  
                                                 
61Pahre 2001, 859-61.  Defined as “a state’s simultaneous negotiations with two or more 
countries on the same issue,” clustering is more akin to behavior. 
62Morrow 2001. 
63Mattli 2001. 
64Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1066. 
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That leaves perhaps at best two or three articles that can offer systematic empirical evaluations of 
the analytical framework. 
 
B. Operationalization of the Variables 
 Further concerns about the comparability of the empirical cases arise from the way in 
which the variables are handled.  For the cases to generate useful findings, the variables must be 
operationalized and measured in a consistent manner.  It is not at all clear, however, whether this 
is in fact the case. 
 The problem begins with the analytical framework, which offers no guidance on this vital 
methodological issue to those who would attempt to evaluate the conjectures.  This oversight 
would seem to be especially regrettable insofar as most of the independent variables are both 
relatively abstract and treated as potentially continuous in nature.  For example, Koremenos, 
Lipson, and Snidal write that “Uncertainty refers to the extent (emphasis added) to which actors 
are not fully informed about others’ behavior, the state of the world, and/or others’ 
preferences.”65  Presumably, one can always find at least some evidence of uncertainty with 
regard to each of these factors, especially in international relations.  It becomes vital, then, to be 
able to measure the extent of uncertainty, or at least to be able to distinguish with confidence 
between high and low levels of uncertainty; otherwise, it effectively becomes a constant.  Similar 
sets of concerns attend the operationalization and measurement of enforcement problems, which 
“refers to the strength (emphasis added) of individual actors’ incentives to cheat on a given 
agreement or set of rules,”66 and of distribution problems, the “magnitude” (emphasis added) of 
                                                 
65Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001b, 778. 
66Ibid., 776. 
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which “depends on how each actor compares its preferred alternative to other actors’ preferred 
alternatives.”67 
 The degree to which the variables are in fact measured in a consistent manner in the case 
studies is difficult to ascertain.  Although some authors provide separate discussions of their 
characterizations of the variables, in other cases these are not at all highlighted and the reader 
must hunt for them in the text.  Nevertheless, some inconsistencies are readily apparent.  For 
example, Kydd focuses on the restrictiveness of NATO membership criteria, while Pahre 
measures membership in terms of the number of states that actually join the trade regime.68  For 
their part, Mitchell and Keilbach redefine scope in terms of the choice among three ideal-types of 
bargains rather than the breadth of issues covered per se.69  There is somewhat more consistency 
with regard to the handling of centralization – the degree to which important institutional tasks 
are performed by a single focal entity – but here, too, one finds discrepancies, such as Morrow’s 
inclusion of treaty negotiation and ratification as centralized tasks, Mattli’s treatment of 
centralization as the degree to which arbitration takes place within pre-existing centers rather 
than on an ad hoc basis, and Pahre’s equation of centralization with clustering.70 
 Ironically, one important source of consistency in measurement is itself a cause of further 
problems: a pronounced tendency to treat the independent variables not as potentially continuous 
but as dichotomous.  Frequently, the authors of the empirical cases seem content to note simply 
that distribution or enforcement problems exist or that various types of uncertainty are present 
                                                 
67Ibid., 774. 
68Kydd 2001; Pahre 2001, 879, 888. 
69Mitchell and Keilbach 2001. 
70Morrow 2001; Mattli 2001; Pahre 2001. 
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rather than attempt to discern their extent, magnitude, or strength.  This simplification, although 
not mandated by the framework, may be necessary in practice, but it greatly limits the ability of 
the project to explain variations in the wider range of values that can be assumed by the non-
dichotomous dependent variables. 
 A notable exception to this tendency is the article by Mitchell and Keilbach, which 
explicitly examines variation in the severity of enforcement and distribution problems.71  Rather 
than attempt to measure these directly, however, they focus on variation in the asymmetry of 
externalities, which represents an amalgamation of the two types of cooperation problems.  As a 
result, it is not possible to establish directly the relationship between enforcement and 
distribution problems, on the one hand, and the dependent variables of interest, on the other, and 
thus to determine which independent variable, if any, exerts the most influence. 
 
C.  Overall Lack of Empirical Support 
 As a result of such problems with case selection and execution, the special issue is able to 
offer at best a very limited evaluation of the conjectures and thus of the framework.  This 
conclusion follows in part from an examination of the frequency with which the conjectures 
appear in the empirical chapters (see Table 1).  In fact, a majority (nine of 16) are addressed in 
two or fewer case studies.  Of the remaining seven conjectures, four appear in three cases, two 
appear in four cases, and one appears in five, while just one of the seven is consistently 
supported by the evidence, according to the summary table of results.72 
 Notwithstanding this fact, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal conclude that 11 of the 
                                                 
71Mitchell and Keilbach 2001. 
72Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1055. 
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conjectures received either strong, very strong, or extremely strong support.  To be sure, no 
canonical methodological criteria exist for making such judgments.  Nevertheless, one might 
expect a somewhat more qualified endorsement of the conjectures in view of the limited number 
of cases in which they are addressed – five of the 11 are considered in only one or two cases. 
 The need for caution is further suggested by a partial review of the results as presented in 
the case studies.  For example, the second and third (of three) conjectures about the inclusiveness 
of membership (designated M2 and M3) are said to receive strong support based on the findings 
in two and three cases, respectively.  Yet most if not all of these findings are problematic.  
Kydd’s conclusion that restrictive NATO membership criteria are a response to uncertainty over 
preferences, supporting M2, follows from a formal model in which differing levels of uncertainty 
are assumed rather than from a careful examination of empirical evidence.73  Pahre, whose focus 
is on centralization, discusses M3 only tangentially and explicitly acknowledges that he does not 
test it formally.74  Morrow’s finding that the system of POW treaties supports M2 (“restrictive 
membership increases with uncertainty about preferences”) is undercut by his observation that 
the membership rules are not restrictive; the only states that are not members are those that 
choose not to ratify the treaties.75  And Richard’s early observation that “intense distributional 
concerns in postwar aviation markets led to inclusive membership, confirming conjecture M3" is 
                                                 
73Kydd 2001, 803 and 821. 
74Pahre 2001,  879, 888.  A further problem is that Pahre’s reference to membership 
concerns the regimes within which centralization (clustering) of negotiations may or may not 
take place rather than which states actually participate in the clustering. 
75Morrow 2001,  983, 985-86.   Morrow also concludes that M3 is only weakly 
supported. 
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at odds with the fact that the international markets were defined and largely regulated by 
exclusive bilateral interstate agreements.76 
 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal also draw conclusions about the importance of the 
different independent variables as possible guidance for future research.  In particular, they are 
struck by the relatively high frequency with which distributional concerns and uncertainty appear 
in tests of the conjectures in the various cases, and with which those tests yield confirmations.77  
The validity of such “findings” is highly dependent, however, on the representativeness and 
appropriateness of the cases as well as how well they are executed, all of which can be 
questioned. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 The Rational Design project represents a valuable contribution to the theoretical literature 
on international institutions.  In particular, it offers a useful foundation on which to build theories 
about the particular forms that institutions take.  As presented in the special issue, however, the 
project contains a number of significant limitations.  Some of these, such as the relatively limited 
range of institutions to which it applies and the types of questions that are asked about them, 
concern the scope of the project and are largely a matter of choice.  All that may be required to 
address such limitations is a more thorough and explicit discussion of the boundaries of the 
enterprise. 
 Other existing weaknesses, however, especially those concerning the analytical 
                                                 
76Richard 2001, 995.  It is perhaps noteworthy that Richards does not repeat this assertion 
in the body or conclusion of the article. 
77Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001a, 1063. 
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framework and the attempts made thus far to evaluate it empirically, have directly impeded the 
achievement of the project’s goal of offering a systematic account of institutional design 
features.  Consequently, they must be addressed if the project is to realize its full potential.  
Fortunately, this task should not represent an insuperable challenge.  The above discussion has 
suggested that most, if not all, of these shortcomings are remediable. 
 Turning first to the framework, more thought needs to be given to both the dependent and 
independent variables of interest before further empirical evaluation is attempted.  Alternative 
formulations of both sets of variables should be considered and discussed, with explicit reference 
being made to other possibilities that can be found in the institutional literature.  An attempt 
should be made to relate such abstract phenomena as distribution and enforcement problems to 
more fundamental -- if still somewhat intangible -- factors such as interests, power, and beliefs.  
In addition, at least some of the current variables, notably centralization, would seem to require 
further disaggregation before they can be applied fruitfully in empirical studies.  As for the 
conjectures, much more effort must be made to exploit the most distinctive feature of the project, 
which is its attempt to bring together multiple dependent and independent variables within a 
single analytical framework.  In particular, given the resulting potential for multiple institutional 
equilibria, significantly more attention needs to be given to possible interactions among the 
variables. 
 With regard to the empirical evaluation of the framework, cases must be selected in 
accordance with explicit, methodologically-sound criteria.  It will be useful eventually to explore 
how well the framework applies to norm-based institutional forms, case-by-case selection among 
pre-existing institutional alternatives, and related phenomena like Pahre’s clustering.  But given 
that the Rational Design project is still in its early stages, empirical testing should be tightly 
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restricted to cases that are indisputably at the heart of the project’s ambit, namely the design of 
explicit, negotiated, arrangements. 
 From a practical standpoint, it might also be advisable to focus initially on the evaluation 
of a more limited number of conjectures as defined by subsets of the most important dependent 
and independent variables.  In the eight empirical articles contained in the special issue, for 
example, some 22 of the 37 “tests” concerned the six conjectures associated with combinations 
of three of the five dependent variables (membership, centralization, flexibility) and three of the 
six independent variables (distribution, enforcement, uncertainty about the state of the world).78  
Arguably, more useful results might have been obtained if the authors had been encouraged to 
delve deeply into those questions rather than attempt to address all potentially relevant 
conjectures.  Nevertheless, such a strategy makes sense only if significant design trade-offs are 
not expected to exist with other variables or cases can be chosen in such a way that other 
variables are held constant. 
 Finally, it behooves the project organizers to develop and publicize explicit guidelines 
with regard to how the variables might be operationalized and measured.  Insofar as the project 
remains under central direction, moreover, they might usefully review the way in which the 
variables are handled in future case studies.  Failing that, the development of a more standard 
format for presenting descriptions of the variables and evaluations of the conjectures would 
facilitate cross-case comparisons and external assessments. 
                                                 
78In contrast, only 15 tests concerned the other 10 conjectures associated with the 
remaining dependent variables (scope and control) and independent variables (number of actors, 
asymmetry of actors, uncertainty about behavior, uncertainty about preferences), making it more 
difficult to evaluate them. 
  32 
  33 
References 
Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O.  Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and 
Duncan Snidal.  2000.  The Concept of Legalization.  International Organization 54 
(3):401-19. 
Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane.  1993.  Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical 
Framework.  In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, 
edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O.  Keohane, 3-30.  Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press. 
Gruber, Lloyd. 2000.  Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational 
Institutions.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Keohane, Robert O. 1989.  International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory.  Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001a.  Rational Design: Looking 
Back to Move Forward.  International Organization 55 (4):1051-82. 
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal.  2001b.  The Rational Design of 
International Institutions.  International Organization 55 (4):761-99. 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983.  Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables.  In  International Regimes., edited by Stephen D.  Krasner, 1-21.  
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1991.  Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto 
Frontier.  World Politics 43 (3):336-56. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986.  International Organization: A State of the 
Art of the Art of the State.  International Organization 40 (4):754-75. 
  34 
Kydd, Andrew.  2001.  Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement.  
International Organization 55 (4):801-28. 
Legro, Jeffrey. 1997.  Which Norms Matter?  Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism. 
International Organization 51 (1):31-63. 
Lipson, Charles. 1991.  Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?  International 
Organization 45 (4):495-538. 
Martin, Lisa L. 1992a.  Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions.  
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Martin, Lisa L. 1992b.  Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.  International Organization 46 
(4):765-92. 
Martin, Lisa L., and Beth Simmons. 1998.  Theories and Empirical Studies of International 
Institutions.  International Organization 52 (4):729-57 
Mattli, Walter.  2001.  Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration.  
International Organization 55 (4):919-47. 
Mitchell, Ronald B., and Patricia M. Keilbach.  2001.  Situation Structure and Institutional 
Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange.  International Organization 55 (4):891-
917. 
Morrow, James D.  2001.  The Institutional Features of Prisoners of War Treaties.  International 
Organization 55 (4):971-91. 
Pahre, Robert.  2001.  Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations.  International 
Organization 55 (4):859-90. 
Richards, John E. 1999.  Toward a Positive Theory of International Institutions: Regulating 
International Aviation Markets.  International Organization 53 (1):1-37 
  35 
Richards, John E. 2001.  Institutions for Flying: How States Built a Market in International 
Aviation Services.  International Organization 55 (4):993-1017. 
Ruggie, John Gerard.  1983.  International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.  In International Regimes, edited by Stephen 
D.  Krasner, 195-231.  Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Schauer, Frederick.  1991.  Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based 
Decision Making in Law and in Life.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Snidal, Duncan. 1985.  Coordination vs Prisoners Dilemma: Implications for International 
Cooperation and Regimes.  American Political Science Review 79 (4):923-42 
Stein, Arther. 1983.  Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World.  In 
International Regimes, edited by Stephen D.  Krasner, 115-40.  Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press. 
Tallberg, Jonas. 2002.  Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What 
Consequences?  West European Politics 25 (1):23-46. 
Wallander, Celeste A.  2000.  Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.  
International Organization 54 (4):705-37. 
Wendt, Alexander. 1999.  Social Theory of International Politics.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wendt, Alexander. 2001.  Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of 
Institutional Design.  International Organization 55 (4):1019-49. 
Young, Oran R. 1989.  International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and 
the Environment.  Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Zürn, Michael.  1997.  Assessing State Preferences and Explaining Institutional Choice: The 
  36 
Case of Intra-German Trade.  International Studies Quarterly 41 (2):295-320. 
 
Table 1: Conjectures 
 
 
 Severity of 
Distribution 
Problem 
(9) 
Severity of 
Enforcement 
Problem 
(8) 
Actors Uncertainty about 
Number* 
(4) 
Asymmetry 
(1) 
Behavior 
(3) 
State of World 
(10) (2) 
Membership 
Restrictiveness 
(8) 
M3 
▼ 
(3) 
M1 
▲ 
(3) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- ▲ 
(2) 
Scope 
(3) 
S2 
▲ 
(2) 
S3 
▲ 
(1) 
S1 
▲ 
(0) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- --- 
Centralization 
(12) 
 
 
--- 
C4 
▲ 
(4) 
C3 
▲ 
(2) 
 
--- 
C1 
▲ 
(3) 
C2 
▲ 
(3) 
— 
 
Control 
(4) 
 
 
--- 
 
--- 
V1 
▼ 
(1) 
V2 
▲ 
(1) 
 
--- 
V3 
▲ 
(2) 
--- 
Flexibility 
(10) 
 
F2 
▲ 
(4) 
--- F3 
▼ 
(1) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
F1 
▲ 
(5) 
--- 
 
 
▲ indicates a positive relationship 
▼ indicates a negative relationship 
— indicates that no conjecture was offered 
( ) indicates number of appearances in case studies 
* Number may also refer to the heterogeneity of the actors 
 
 
